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IN THE UTAH SUPREMECOURT
BRIGHAM CITY,

)

Plaintiff-Petitioner,
vs.

)
)

CHARLES W. STUART, SHAYNE
R. STUART and SANDRA A.
TAYLOR
Defendants-Respondents

Case No. 20021004-SC

)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
from its decision in Brigham City v. Stuart, 2002 UT App 317, 57 P.3d 1111 (Addendum
B). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2(5)
(2002).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue: Are the trial court's Findings of Fact and its conclusion that no exigent
circumstance existed mutually exclusive?
Standard of Review: When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
reviews the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the trial court. State v.
Warren, 2003 UT 36, P12; State v. Topanotes 2003 UT 30, P8; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT
125, P25, 63 P.3d 650; State v. James, 2000 UT P8,13 P.3d 576. The decision of the
court of appeals is reviewed for correctness. Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

U.S. Constitution amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
On July 23, 2000, defendants were arrested at a home in Brigham City on various
misdemeanor charges and they filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered as a
result of the warrantless entry by Brigham City police into the residence. Their argument
was that there was no exigent circumstance sufficient to justify a warrantless entry into
5

the dwelling. The trial court agreed, making five specific findings of fact, concluding that
the circumstances did not fall within the "exigent circumstances" exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, and granted the motion. (Addendum A.) The court of
appeals first declined Brigham City's request to make additional findings of fact. Stuart,
2002 Ut App 317, P 6, 10, 11. The court then concluded that based upon those specific
findings of fact, the conclusion of the trial court was correct. Id at P 13,15. This Court
granted Brigham City's petition for a writ of certiorari.

SUMMARY OF FACTS
On July 23, 2000, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Brigham City police
received a call complaining about a loud party at 1074 Orchard St. in Brigham city, and
officers were dispatched. Upon their arrival, the officers determined that no one was in
the front part of the house and the noises and loud voices were emanating from the rear.
They declined to knock on the front door, citing concerns for their safety, and went
around the house down the driveway to the backyard where there was a six-foot privacy
fence around the yard. The officers testified that they saw two minors in the backyard
consuming alcohol. They then entered the back yard through the closed gate.
Subsequently they observed through the kitchen window four adults (two male and two
female) restraining and trying to calm another youth. The officer testified he saw the
youth free a hand and strike one of the adults. There was a great deal of yelling and
struggling and the officer testified that the person whom he saw get hit was at the sink,
rinsing the blood out of his mouth with water whereupon on officer opened the door,
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stepped in, and announced his presence. When no one paid attention to him, he stepped
in front of the adults and more forcefully announced his presence. He then testified that it
still took a lengthy period of time for anyone to acknowledge him. The officers arrested
the three juveniles, releasing one to his parents, and five adults (one had been in bed
asleep at the time). The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that
there was no exigent circumstance to justify the warrantless entry into the home. The
prosecution argued that there were two potential exigent circumstances: a medical
emergency and the presence of an immediate serious threat to someone. The court found
that neither of those circumstances existed and Brigham City objected to the Findings of
Fact proposed by the defense, offering their own version, which was adopted by the court.
These were the findings to which both parties stipulated on appeal, and the Court of
Appeals concluded that given the Findings of Fact, the trial court did not err in
determining that the circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry into the private
residence.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The court of appeals made a very narrow ruling that is not at all subject to broad
application. The ruling was based solely upon the findings of the trial court which were
unchallenged by Petitioner. Indeed, they were drafted by Petitioner and in no way do they
mandate a conclusion there were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless
entry into the home. The court of appeals properly reviewed the trial court's application
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of well-established Fourth Amendment principles to the undisputed facts in the case. The
court's dicta in paragraph thirteen can in no way be construed as establishing a new
standard for determining exigent circumstances in Fourth Amendment analysis nor was it
the basis for the court's decision. That dicta is simply not an issue in this case.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACCURATELY REVIEWED THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court of appeals first declined to make additional findings of fact that would
be necessary to support a conclusion of exigent circumstances in this case. Brigham City
had made the request during oral arguments. Id. at P 10,11. In paragraph 7 of the
opinion, the court points out that the prosecution bears a "particularly heavy" burden
when trying to show that particular circumstances fall within an accepted exception to the
Fourth Amendment's general rule that a warrant is required to enter a private dwelling.
This view is completely in accord with United States Supreme Court cases and Utah
cases concerning the Fourth Amendment. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah App.
1993); Welsh v. Wisconsin 466 U.S. 740, 749-750, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (1984); Mincey v.
Arizona, All U.S. 385, 394-395, 98 S.Ct 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).
The court then went on to define when exigent circumstances exist sufficient to
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justify an exception to the general requirement of a warrant in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the
opinion. Again, this definition is absolutely in line with U.S. Supreme Court and Utah
decisions. State v. Beavers, supra.; United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th
Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824,105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). Paragraph 9 of
the opinion addresses the application of those principles to the review of the trial court's
determination and then the court applies those principles to the specific findings of fact of
the trial court in paragraphs 12 and 13. It is simply impossible to conclude that the court
of appeals used an inappropriate standard of review or that the review of the decision was
inaccurate.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DOES NOT SET AN UNREASONABLE
STANDARD

The opinion of the court of appeals in Stuart is very narrowly drawn. The bulk of
the opinion concerned the point that the trial court's findings of fact were unchallenged
and supported the trial court's conclusion of law. The Stuart opinion doesn't really set
any standards for warrantless entries at all. It recognizes those standards previously set
and well-recognized, then follows them. Paragraph 13 contains dicta misconstrued by
Petitioner as necessary elements to find exigent circumstances. When the court made the
statement that "the officers did not immediately physically intervene in the situation,
draw weapons, or otherwise act in a manner suggesting an emergency," it was not
declaring that such things must be done to enter a dwelling, only that the testimony
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concerning the actions of the officers supported the trial court's conclusion that no
emergency existed. Once they entered the home, the officers spent a great deal of time
trying to draw attention to themselves , not intervening to protect anyone nor acting as
though they needed to protect themselves nor giving any medical assistance to anyone.
The court of appeals merely pointed out that the trial court's findings of fact did not
include a finding that an emergency of any sort existed, and thus, a conclusion that there
was no exigent circumstance was not in error. The standard for finding exigent
circumstances, according to Stuart is that entry must be necessary to prevent physical
harm to the officers or other persons, to prevent the destruction of relevant evidence or
the escape of the suspect. The need for immediate entry must be apparent to police at the
time of entry and it must be so strong as to outweigh the important protection of
individual rights provided under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at P8.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO THE CONCLUSIION
THAT PETITIONER DEMANDS

Petitioner focuses upon paragraphs 4 & 5 of the Order on Motion to Suppress
Evidence by the trial court (Addendum B). Specifically paragraph 4 states that there was
"some kind of an altercation taking place, wherein it appeared that four adults were trying
to control a juvenile. At one point, the juvenile got a hand loose and smacked one of the
occupants of the residence in the nose." Petitioner urges that upon reading the foregoing,
no reasonable person could possibly conclude anything other than that the persons within
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the house were facing an emergency of such proportions and gravity that the aid of
immediate police intervention was absolutely necessary. This of course ignores the fact
that the court was clearly taking the position that even if one views this situation in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, there was no emergency, at least nothing that
required immediate intervention by the police, and certainly nothing outweighing the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. The court made no findings indicating
any emergency existed, nor that the police actually aided anyone. There was no finding
that the police even separated the person struck from the person who struck him (which
they did not). At no point did the court use the terms "fight," "combat," "combatants,"
"danger," "injury," "emergency," "threat,"' "risk," "serious," "harm," or anything similar
to describe the situation. Without such a finding it would have been entirely
inappropriate to conclude that an exigent circumstance requiring immediate, official
action existed.

A SIMPLIFIED VIEW OF THIS CASE

The court of appeals ruled lhat the trial court's Findings of Fact were never
challenged by Appellant and both Appellant and Appellees stipulated to those Findings
of Fact. Petitioner did not object to this ruling in its petition nor address it in its brief.
The court of appeals also ruled that the facts as found by the trial court supported the
conclusion that no exigent circumstances existed. Petitioner objected to this ruling and
has asked this court to rule that if police officers see an assault, that is an exigent
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circumstance. The court of appeals also included certain dicta in its discussion of the
case in paragraph 13. Petitioner strongly objected to that dicta citing it as the basis and
reasoning for the court's decision. The dicta is merely explanatory. It was clearly not the
basis for the decision and it is a non-issue. So is the matter of an assault. Regardless of
how a police officer wants to label that which he sees, certain criteria must be met before
a circumstance may be considered exigent with regard to an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth amendment. That which is legitimately before this Court on
certiorari review is the issue of whether or not the Findings of Fact of the trial court
preclude a reasonable person from coming to the conclusion to which the trial court
arrived. If those two are indeed mutually exclusive, then the decision of the court of
appeals is in error. If, however, given the facts specifically found by the trial court, a
reasonable person could possibly conclude that the people within the house did not
necessarily need immediate police intervention for their protection, then the court of
appeals was not in error and the ruling must be affirmed.

AN ADDITIONAL ISSUE-MINOR VIOLATIONS

There is an additional issue that Petitioer has refused or neglected to discuss. That
is that both Utah and U.S. cases point out that even if the prosecution can establish
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the exception to the warrant requirement is not
applicable if there is only a minor violation involved. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,
14(footnote 6) (Utah App. 1993) quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753. Surely,
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by anyone's standard, the violations with which these defendants were charged are minor
violations and the result should be affirmed on this basis alone.

CONCLUSION

The court of appeals accurately reviewed the decision of the trial court according
to the proper standard of review. The Findings of Fact, to which both parties stipulated,
not only support the conclusion of no exigent circumstance, without additional or even
contrary findings, they preclude any other conclusion. Respondents respectfully urge the
Court to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED OCTOBER 17, 2003.

LOD GILMORE
Attorney for Respondents

13

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee postage prepaid to:

Leonard J. Carson
Attorney for Appellant
P.O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876

Jeffrey S. Gray
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

DATED THIS 17th DAY OF OCTOBER, 2003

COD GILMORE
'ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS

14

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAg:

BRIGHAM CITY,
A Municipal Corporation,

ORDER ON MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 001100454,001100456, and
001100460

CHARLES W. STUART, SHAYNE R.
TAYLOR, and SANDRA A. TAYLOR,
Defendants.

Judge Clint S. Judkins

This matter came before the court for hearing the 23rd day of March, 2001 on defendants9
motion to suppress. Brigham City was represented by James MerrelL Defendants were present
and represented by Rod Gilmores After the presentation of evidence, including testimony and
exhibits, the careful review of the parties' pleadings, and after having heard the parties9
arguments, the Court hereby finds and orders as follows:

FINDINGS QF FACT
1.

On July 23,2001, at approximately 3:00 a.m., four Brigham City Police officers were

dispatched to 1074 Orchard St in Brigham City as a result of a call concerning a loud party.
2.

After arrival at the residence, the officers, from their observations from thefrontof the

residence, determined that it was obvious that knocking on thefrontdoor would have done no
good It was appropriate that they proceed down the driveway alongside the house to further
investigate.
3.

After going down die driveway on the side of the house, the officers could see, through a

slat fence, two juveniles consuming alcoholic beverages. At that point, because of the juveniles,
there was probable cause for the officers to enter into the backyard.
4.

Upon entering the backyard, the officers observed, through windows and a screen door,

CAQ-n LA

an altercation taking place, wherein it appeared that four adults were trying to control a juvenile.
At one point, the juvenile got a hand loose and smacked one of the occupants of the residence in
the nose.
5.

At that point in time, the court finds no exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the

officer's entry into the residence. What he should have done, as required under the 4th
amendment, was knock on the door. The evidence is that there was a loud, tumultuous thing
going on, and the evidence is that the occupants probably would not have heard him, but under
the 4th amendment he has an obligation to at least attempt before entering.
ORDER
Based upon the above findings, and for good cause shown, the Court HEREBY
ORDERS:
The Motion to Suppress filed by defendants is GRANTED. All evidence gathered or
seized subsequent to the officers9 entry into the house, including but not limited to physical
evidence, photographs taken, observations made by the officers, and statements and actions
made by the suspects, are HEREBY SUPPRESSED, and not admissible in any further
proceeding against the defendants.
DATED, this the

1*6

day of May, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

f. *
\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UPON OPPOSINC COUNSEL
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, counsel for Plaintiff
hereby certifies that he served a copy of the foregoing Order upon RooVCnifcqre^attojTievibr
defendants, at 154 Blue Sage LaneyfcaytoiHsJJT
84041, by moling a ^opy th^fofthej£_^ day
5rfcaytoMJT 84
of May, 2001.

ATTORNEY

Notice of objection to the proposed documents must be submitted to the Court and
counsel within five (5) days after service.

ADDENDUM B

BRIGHAM LIT Y v. STUAEII
Cite as 57 P.3d III! (UtahApp. 2002)

2002 UrApp317

BRIGHAM CITY, a municipal
corporation, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Charles W. STUART, Shayne R. Taylor,
and Sandra A. Taylor, Defendants
and Appellees.
No. 20010479-CA.

able person m the officers* position would
believe that entry was necessary to prevent
physical harm to the officers or other persons, to prevent the destruction of relevant
evidence, to prevent the escape of the suspect, or to prevent the improper frustration
of legitimate law enforcement efforts.
H.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct 3, 2002
Defendants were charged in the First
District Court, Brigham City Department,
Clint S. Judkins, J., with contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct,
intoxication, and filed a motion to suppress
which was granted. City appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Thome, J., held that exigent
circumstances did not exist to justify officers'
warrantless entry into private residence.
Affirmed.
Bench, J., dissented and filed a separate
opinion.
1. Criminal Law <S=»1134<3), 1158(4)
An appellate court reviews the factual
findings underlying a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence
for clear error, and the legal conclusions for
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal
standard to the facts.
2. Searches and Seizures <*»40.1,42.J
A warrantless search of a residence is
constitutionally permissible where probable
cause and exigent circumstances are proven
U.S.CA ConstAmend. 4.
3. Searches and Seizures $»192.1
When a private residence is involved, the
State's burden in proving the existence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless search is particularly
heavy; such elevated burden is a result of the
heightened expectation of privacy that citizens enjoy in their homes. U.S.CLA. Const.
Amend. 4.

5. Searches and Seizures e=»42.1
in order for exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless search, the need for
immediate entry must be apparent to police
at the time of entry, and so strong as to
outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided under the Fourth
Amendment U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Searches and Seizures <s=s»42.1
The determination by an appellate court
of exigent circumstances needed to justify a
warrantless search is based upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4
7. Searches and Seizures <s=»201
An appellate court grants the trial court
a degree of discretion in determining the
ultimate disposition concerning whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless
search because the facts to which the legal
rule is to be applied are so complex and
varying that no rule adequately addressing
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled
jut.

8. Criminal Law <35»1158(1)
An appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity and
should defer to the trial court on factual
matters.

9. Searches and Seizures @=»42.1
Exigent circumstances did not exist to
justify officers' warrantless entry into private
residence; while evidence existed that some
sort of altercation had occurred in the residence, nothing indicated that the altercation
posed an immediate serious threat or created
4. Searches and Seizures e»42.1
a threat of escalating violence, officers did
"Exigent circumstances" needed to justi- not immediately physically intervene in the
fy a warrantless search exist where a reason- situation, draw weapons, or otherwise act in
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a manner suggesting an emergency, and
findings did not support a conclusion that the
destruction of evidence would have occurred,
that the escape of any suspect was imminent,
or that any legitimate law enforcement effort
would have been frustrated had the officers
not been granted immediate entry into the
residence. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
10. Criminal Law e»1028
Generally, absent exceptional circumstances or plain error, a party who fails to
bring an issue to the trial court's attention is
barred from asserting it on appeal
11. Criminal Law e»1031(l)
City failed to preserve for appellate review its claim that officers were justified in
entering private residence because officers
observed first-hand the commission of a
crime, where city failed to raise such argument at trial level and failed to argue plain
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal.
Leonard J. Carson, Mann, Hadfield &
Thome, Brigham City, for Appellant
Rod Gilmore, Layton, for Appellees.
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD,
andTHORNE.
OPINION
THORNE, Judge.
11 Brigham City appeals from an interlocutory order granting Defendants* joint Motion to Suppress Evidence collected after
Brigham City police officers entered a private residence without first obtaining a warrant We affirm.
BACKGROUND
1 2 On July 23,2000, at approximately 3:00
a.m., four Brigham City police officers responded to a loud party complaint After
arriving at the house, the officers proceeded
to the back of the house to investigate the
noise. From the driveway, through a slat
fence, the officers saw two young men, who
appeared to be under age, consuming alcohol.
The officers entered the backyard through a
gate, thereby obtaining a clear view into the
back of the house.
13 Looking into the house through a
screen door and two windows, the officers

observed four adults restraining one juvenile.
The juvenile, who was struggling to break
free, managed to swing his fist and strike one
of the adults in the face. Two of the officers
then opened the screen door and stepped
into the house. Only after entering the
house did one of the officers shout to identify
and call attention to himself. One by one,
each person in the kitchen became aware of
and acknowledged the officers* presence,
then become angry that the officers had entered the house without permission.
14 The officers subsequently arrested
each of the adults and charged them with:
contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
disorderly conduct, and intoxication. Defendants filed a joint Motion to Suppress Evidence. After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court granted Defendants' motion.
Brigham City submitted a proposed order to
the trial court that contained the trial court's
findings of fact That order was signed as
proposed and it is from this order that Brigham City now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] 15 We review the factual findings
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or
deny a motion to suppress evidence for clear
error, and the legal conclusions for correctness, ''with a measure of discretion given to
the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.** State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d
1245,1247 (Utah CtApp.1996).
16 In the present case, neither party disputes the written factual findings that support the trial court's legal conclusion that no
exigent circumstances justified the officers*
warrantless entry into the private residence.
We accordingly review the trial court's application of Fourth Amendment principles to
the undisputed facts of this case. See id.
ANALYSIS
[2,3] 17 Brigham City argues the trial
court erred in determining that there were
no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into a private residence. MA
warrantless search of a residence is constitutionally permissible where probable cause
and exigent circumstances are proven."

BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART
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State v. Yoden 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct.
App.1997). When a private residence is involved, the State's burden in proving the
existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances is "particularly heavy." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). This elevated
burden is a result of the "heightened expectation of privacy" that citizens enjoy in their
homes. State v. Beaver^ &59 P2d 9f 13
CUtah Ct.App.1993)
[4,5] US Exigent circumstances exist
where a reasonable person in the officers'
position would " 'believe that entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, [to prevent] the destruction of relevant evidence, [to prevent]
the escape of the suspect,' " or to prevent the
improper frustration of legitimate law enforcement efforts. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18
(citation and ellipsis omitted). In addition,
the need for immediate entry must be apparent to police at the time of entry, and so
strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided under the
Fourth Amendment See id.
[6,7] 1 9 Our determination of exigency
is based upon an examination of the totality
of the circumstances. See State v. Wells, 928
P.2d 386, 389 (Utah CtApp.1996), affd, 939
P.2d 1204. We grant the trial court a degree
of discretion in determining the ultimate disposition because " 'the facts to which the
legal rule is to be applied are so complex and
varying that no rule adequately addressing
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled
out....' " State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922,
929 (Utah CtApp.1994) (ellipsis in original)
(quoting State u Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939
(Utah 1994)).
[8] f 10 We first address Brigham City's
request, made during oral argument, that
this court make any additional findings of
fact that might be necessary to find exigent
circumstances in this case. However, an
" 'appellate court is entrusted with ensuring
legal accuracy and uniformity and should defer to the trial court on factual matters.' "
Bailey v. BayUs, 2002 UT 58,119, 52 P.3d
1. The trial court first directed Defendants t
draft and submit an appropriate order. Brigham
City, however, objected to the findings as drafted
and proffered a substitution. Over Defendant's
objections, the trial court adopted Brigham City s

1158 (quoting Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226,
230-31 (Utah 1997)). The supreme court has
further determined:
It is inappropriate for an appellate court to
disregard the trial court's findings of fact
and to assume the role of weighing evidence and making its own findings of fact
The court of appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and
may not find mm facts or reweigh the
evidence. ..
Id. at 1 f 19-20.
f 11 In addition, Brigham City has previously forsaken an opportunity to shape the
trial court's findings of fact1 Brigham City
has not, however, challenged the trial court's
factual findings. We therefore accept the
findings as adopted and are in no position to
supplement these findings. Thus, based
upon the factual findings set forth in the trial
court's order, we review the trial court's legal
conclusion that no exigent circumstances existed in this case
t12 Brigham City next argues that the
circumstances, as found by the court, clearly
establish exigent circumstances supporting
the officers' warrantless entry into the private residence. The trial court made the
following findings of fact:
1. On July 23,2001, at approximately 3:00
a.m., four Brigham. City Policy officers
were dispatched . . . as a result of a call
concerning a loud party.
2. After arrival at the residence, the officers, from their observations from the
front of the residence, determined that it
was obvious that knocking on the front
door would have done no good. It was
appropriate that they proceed down the
driveway alongside the house to further
investigate.
3. After going down the driveway on the
side of the house, the officers could see,
through a slat fence, two juveniles consuming alcoholic beverages. At that point,
because of the juveniles, there was probatision ot the ordei and findings Therefore,
any findings Brigham City considered necessary
to support a conclusion of exigent circumstances
should have been included in this order
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ble cause for the officers to enter into the
backyard.
4. Upon entering the backyard, the officers observed, through windows and a
screen door an altercation taking place,
wherein it appeared that four adults were
trying to control a juvenile. At one point,
the juvenile got a hand loose and smacked
one of the occupants of the residence in
the nose.
5. At that point in time, the court finds
no exigent circumstances to justify the officer's entry into the residence. What he
should have done, as required under the
4th amendment, was knock on the door.
The evidence is that there was a loud,
tumultuous thing going on, and the evidence is that the occupants probably would
not have heard, but under the 4th amendment he has an obligation to at least attempt before entering.
[9] 113 After reviewing the trial court's
ruling, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the officers' warrantless
entry into the private residence was not justified by the circumstances. The trial court
found that some sort of altercation had occurred in the house, but made no findings;
from which we could reasonably conclude
that the altercation posed an immediate serious threat or created a threat of escalating
violence. Furthermore, the officers did not,
immediately physically intervene in the situation, draw weapons, or otherwise act in a
manner suggesting an emergency. Neither
do the trial court's findings support a conclusion that the destruction of evidence would
2. In reaching its conclusion, the dissent relics
upon State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d
55, where police entered a home without a war*
rant in response to a domestic violence complaint Id at 123. In Comer, "admittedly a
close case," we stated that "the officers had
probable cause to believe a domestic violence
offense had been, or was being, committed." Id
at 12S. We noted that a " 'domestic violence
complaint" is 'one of the most potentially dangerous, volatile arrest situations confronting police.' " Id (citations omitted). We identified the
specific facts that would prompt the police to
believe "there was no time to get a warrant
and/or that [their] presence was necessary to
prevent physical harm to persons or the destruction of evidence." Id at 126. The combination
of these factors warranted a finding of exigent
circumstances. See id The holding in Comer,

have occurred, that the escape of any suspect
was imminent, or that any legitimate law
enforcement effort would have been frustrated had the officers not been granted immediate entry into the home. On these limited
facts, we affirm the trial court's conclusion
that exigent circumstances did not exist 2
[10,11] f 14 Brigham City next argues
that the officers were justified in entering
this private residence because the officers
observed, first-hand, the commission of a
crime. Generally, absent exceptional circumstances or plain error, a party who fails to
bring an issue to the trial court's attention is
barred from asserting it on appeal. See
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922
(Utah CtApp.1991). Brigham City neither
raised this argument to the trial court, nor
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal We therefore decline to
address this argument
CONCLUSION
f 15 Because we defer to the trial court's
findings of fact and, to a limited extent, to
the trial court's application of those facts to
the law, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in concluding that no exigent circumstances existed under these facts. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's grant of
Defendants' Motion to Suppress all evidence
resulting from the officer's entry into the
private residence.
f 16 I CONCUR: PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD, Judge.
however, should be narrowly construed, see id. at
n. 11 (characterizing the Comer opinion as adopting approach "for analyzing warrantless police
entry into a private residence after receipt of a
report of domestic violence at that residence")
and only applies when the threat of continued
domestic violence is present
The case at bar is distinguishable from Comer,
for this is not a "domestic violence" situation.
Additionally, the trial court found that the juvenile who seemed to be causing the commotion
was restrained when the police arrived. Thus,
except for the fact that the juvenile's hand broke
loose and "smacked one of the occupants of the
residence in the nose," all violence had ceased by
the time the officers arrived. Also, unlike Comer,
the police in the case at bar had a clear view of
the interior of the home and could have intervened had further violence ensued.
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BENCH, Judge (dissenting).
117 The outcome of this case is controlled
by our recent decision in State v. Comer,
2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55. In Comer,
officers arrived at a home after receiving a
call from a citizen that a family fight was in
progress. See id at K2. The defendant
opened the door and stepped out onto the
porch. See id The officers explained to her
why they were there and asked if anyone
else was home. See id. The defendant did
not respond, but " 'immediately turned and
walked back inside the residence.' " Id The
officers followed and discovered defendant's
husband who had marks on his body indicating he had been assaulted. See id at K 3.
While arresting the defendant for assault,
the officers also discovered drugs and drug
paraphernalia* See id at 14.
K18 We concluded that both probable
cause and exigent circumstances existed to
justify the officers' warrantless entry into the
defendant's home. See id at f 27. We cited
several reasons why the defendant's unexplained behavior "would cause an officer to
reasonably believe there was no time to get a
warrant and/or that his presence was necessary to prevent physical harm to persons or
the destruction of evidence/* including the
officers' reasonable fear that defendant retreated to "immediately resume the altercation reported." Id at 126.
119 If, as we concluded in Comer, an
individual's unexplained behavior and retreat
posed an exigent circumstance, then certainly
a fight in progress qualifies as an exigent
circumstance. In this case, the officers responded to a citizen's call in the middle of the
night about a "loud party or altercation."
The trial court found that the fight they
witnessed was so "loud" and ''tumultuous"
that the occupants of the residence could not
have heard a knock at the door. The officers
personally observed a group of adults restrain a juvenile, who broke loose one arm
and "smacked one of the [adults] in the
nose." These findings do not support the
trial court's conclusion that the officers' warrantless entry into the home was not justified
by exigent circumstances.1
1. The officers might also have been justified in
entering the residence pursuant to the emergency aid doctrine a lanaof to the exigent circum

1120 The majority argues thai Comer is
distinguishable and should be narrowly construed to apply only to known incidences of
domestic violence. I disagree that the exigent circumstances doctrine applies only to
domestic violence situations. However, even
assuming, as the majority does, that Comer
only applies to domestic violence, this case is
not distinguishable. The difference between
a simple assault and a domestic violence assault is the relationship between the parties
involved. From their vantage point outside
the house, the officers in this case could not
know whether any of the combatants in the
house were "cohabitants" as defined by Utah
Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (Supp.2002). Based on
the fact that a juvenile and several adults
were involved and that the altercation was
occurring at a residence, it would be reasonable for the officers to assume that the altercation may have been domestic violence.
Further, I cannot agree with the majority
that the violence had ceased by the time the
officers arrived. The officers testified to witnessing a loud, tumultuous altercation where
one individual was being physically restrained and another had been struck. Even
after entering the house, the officers had a
difficult time getting the attention of the
combatants. It is nonsensical to require officers, charged with keeping the peace, to
witness this degree of violence and take no
action until they see it escalate further.
121 Alternatively, we could remand to the
trial court for a finding on the city's assertion
that the officers were justified in entering
the house because a crime was being committed in their presence. The majority opinion
does not address this argument, claiming
that it was not raised before the trial court.
However, the record reflects that the city did
raise the issue to the trial court in the "Plaintiffs Response to Motion to Suppress." The
city alleged that "the exigent circumstances
which existed included obvious violations of
the law in the plain view and presence of the
officers." Because the trial court made no
specific findings regarding violations of law,
the case could be remanded with instructions
ID the trial court to address whether the
stances exception See Salt Lake City v Daud
son 2000 UT App 12 1 10 994 P 2d 1283.
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officers were justified in entering the home
because a crime was being committed in
their presence.
U22 Accordingly, under Comer, I would
reverse the trial court's grant of Defendants'
motion to suppress. Alternatively, my colleagues should remand for findings on the
cit/s argument that a crime was being committed in the presence of the officers.
(o
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Defendant brought petition for postconviction relief alleging that counsel was ineffective, his plea was involuntary, he was sentenced under an unconstitutional statute, and
the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to
impose sentence. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake Department, William W. Barrett,
J., dismissed petition as frivolous, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Thorne, J., held that: (1) defendant's petition
for postconviction relief was not frivolous on
its face, and (2) trial court exceeded the
bounds of its review.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Criminal Law «=> 1134(3)
An appeal from a judgment on a petition
for post conviction relief raises questions of
law reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusion.
2. Criminal Law <s=>1580(10)
Defendant's petition for postconviction
relief was not frivolous on its face, and thus
remand was required for the trial court to
order the attorney general to file a response
and to hold, if necessary, an evidentiary
hearing; defendant's allegations that he en-

tered a guilty plea based on false promise of
counsel, and that counsel failed to object
when defendant was sentenced under gang
enhancement statute that had been declared
unconstitutional, stated a prima facie claim
that his counsel was ineffective. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
65C(g).
3. Criminal Law <S=>1134(3)
Construction of a rule presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness
and without deference to the lower court's
conclusion.
4. Criminal Law <£=>1575
When a court receives a petition for post
conviction relief it must first evaluate the
petition to determine whether any claim has
been previously adjudicated or whether the
petition appears frivolous on its face. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g).
5. Criminal Law <s»1592
If the facts alleged in the petition for
postconviction relief do not support a claim
for relief as a matter of law, or if the claims
have no arguable basis in fact, then the court
shall dismiss the petition as frivolous on its
face. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g).
6. Criminal Law <3=>1575
To determine whether a post conviction
petition is frivolous, a trial court need only
determine whether the petition contains sufficient facts to state a cause of action. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g).
7. Criminal Law <S=»1575
A trial court must review a post conviction petition on its face to ensure that the
petitioner pleaded each element of the relief
sought Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g).
8. Criminal Law <&=»1575
Trial court exceeded the bounds of its
review of a petition for post conviction relief
when it addressed the underlying merits of
the defendant's petition, rather than determining whether petition was frivolous.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g).
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